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How useful are election campaigns as a site for South African interest groups to 
advocate policy change, either on their own or through allied political parties?  
More broadly, we might ask how useful campaigns are as sites for political 
parties to attract new voters by taking positions on publicly salient issues of 
public policy. At first glance, the answer to both these questions might seem 
obvious. Our popular image of election campaigns sees them either very broadly 
as watershed national conversations about where the country has been and 
where it ought to go, or more narrowly as periodic national debates in which 
political parties, candidates, interest groups and news media try to persuade 
voters about “who did what” in the past five years and “with what 
consequences,” and “who might do what” in the next five years?   
 
But this popular image rests on several assumptions about both political elites 
and ordinary voters. On its face, it assumes that voters come into each campaign 
with a completely open mind ready to hear contending partisan arguments and 
decide accordingly. It also assumes that all voters are able to follow, and are 
interested in following this national conversation through the news media, and 
that they in fact do so. Yet a great deal of research by comparative political 
scientists has demonstrated that voters do not make up their minds tabula rasa at 
each election. Furthermore, we know that political parties and candidates tend to 
focus primarily on mobilizing those voters who already agree with them, and 
only secondarily on persuading smaller groups of undecided, potential “swing” 
voters to change their vote from the last election.   
 
Yet we have relatively little research on how well South Africa’s election 
campaigns function, even in this more limited sense.
1
  The popular image might 
seem to be verified if one only looked at the emphasis given to the most recent 
national election in 2009 by the South African print news media, which in the 
six months leading up to the vote devoted 75 per cent of non-financial news 
coverage to that election.  But this begs the question of whether ordinary voters 
                                                        
1
  For an exception, see Cherrel Africa, The Impact of the 2004 Election Campaign on the 




had access to, were interested in, or actually used this press content.  It also begs 
the question of the quality of this election coverage.   
 
This chapter, therefore, attempts to bring together a range of empirical data to 
lay some basic groundwork for the analysis of election campaigns in South 
Africa and focuses on the following questions.  First, how many South Africans 
have access to the means to follow or join in the potential national conversation 
known as an election campaign? Second, how many South Africans are 
sufficiently interested in and attentive to the debates that occur during the 
campaign? Third, how well do news media communicate these debates to 
ordinary voters? And fourth, how well do South Africa’s political parties 
communicate directly with the voters through face-to-face contacts or media 
advertising? In order to learn as much as we can about the possibilities and 
limits of election campaigns as sites for interest groups advocacy in South 
Africa, it is necessary to place the country in a broader comparative perspective.  
The United States provides the obvious point of comparison because it has 
perhaps the most media intensive electoral process in the world.  
 
 
News media access and use 
 
To return to the example set out above, while print news media devoted 75 
percent of coverage to the 2009 election during the six months leading up to the 
vote, how many people actually had access to newspapers and other news media 
in South Africa, or were sufficiently literate to make use of a newspaper?  
Newspapers and television reception may simply not be available to many 
people in a country with as large a rural population as South Africa?  
Alternatively, purchasing a newspaper on a regular basis, or owning a television 
set might be beyond the means of people who live in poverty (although at least 
one national group, Caxton, distributes local community newspapers in small 
towns free of charge).  And one out of ten South Africans (12 percent) are not 
literate.
2
 While there appears to be no authoritative data on how many South 
Africans are unable to afford a newspaper or who live in areas where 
newspapers are not available, data from the 2008 Afrobarometer show that 80 
percent of all South Africans say they read a newspaper at least once in the 
previous year, though only 54 percent did so regularly (defined as daily, or a few 
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 (see Figure 1). Yet these national figures mask larger variations 
between the city and countryside. Fully 30 percent of people who live in rural 
areas never read a paper (compared to only 10 percent in urban areas), and just 
34 percent read one regularly (as opposed to 66 percent in towns and cities). 
 
Figure 1:  News media use (% every day / few days a week) 
 
 
While newspaper readership is low relative to other types of media, the structure 
of the South African print media industry does offer policy advocates the 
potential to run a cost effective political campaign amongst those readers.  
Through just three daily newspapers, political parties and interest groups could 
have access to about one-fifth to one-quarter of the total reading public: the 
tabloid Daily Sun (4.7 million readers, or 14 percent of all readers); Sowetan 
(with 1.5 million readers or a 5 percent market share); and the Nguni language 
newspaper Isolezwe (with 771,000 readers or a share of 2 percent).
4
 And 
amongst the weekly newspapers, three titles dominate: Sunday Times (4.2 
million, 13 percent), Sunday Sun (2.6 million, 8 per cent) and City Press (2.15 
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4 
million, 6 percent).   
 
Physical access to television is much broader than for newspapers.  As of 2008-
2009, 18 to 19 percent of all households still did not have a television set though 
as can be seen in Figure 2 this has declined sharply from 32 percent in 2001.
5
  
But as with newspapers, people without a television can still watch the news in 
places other than their own homes. As of 2008, Afrobarometer found that 87 per 
cent watched television news on a regular (daily or weekly) basis, a figure which 
has also risen from a low of 72 percent in 2004) (see Figure 1).   
 
Television viewership is even more concentrated than newspaper use.  Just three 
public channels (SABC TV1, 2 and 3) and one private television (eTV) channel 
control the entire broadcast environment, and are watched by between 80 to 86 
percent of all television owners.
6
  Narrowcast news via satellite television is far 
more restricted, reaching only 15 percent of the population (news programming 
by local satellite television was only legalized in 1995 and is still regulated by 
the state Independent Communications Authority (ICASA). 
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5 
Physical access to radio is most widespread.  As of 2008, only one-in-ten (13 
percent) households did not own a radio. That year, 85 percent of respondents 
told Afrobarometer interviewers that they listened to radio news on a frequent 
basis. Furthermore, there is an even higher concentration of listenership amongst 
radio news providers than for print news. Through just three stations, political 
parties and interest groups can reach 47 percent of all radio listeners: Ukhozi 
FM (6 million listeners, 19 percent share), Metro FM (5.2 million, 16 percent) 
and Umhlobo Wenene (4.3 million, 14 percent). While a far larger number of 
stations operate at the community level, they are used collectively by just 24 
percent of all listeners nationally.
7
 In comparison, online media are still, by far, a 
junior partner in the South African news media picture. According to industry 
sources, there are 11.6 million unique users in South Africa.
8
  Surveys, however, 
tend to report lower levels ranging from 17 percent (Futurefact, 2009) to 14 
percent (WorldWide Worx, Afrobarometer, and Markinor). Mobile users of 
internet news currently stand at 3.1 million users.
9
   
 
Not only do television and radio reach far larger shares of people than print, they 
also reach very different types of audiences. For radio and television (especially 
SABC 1 and SABC 2), the majority of viewers and listeners are at the lower 
ends of the economic spectrum (what the South Africa market research industry 
refer to as Living Standards Measures 1 through 5, which is basically one-half of 
the adult population). Newspapers, in contrast, reach people who are at the 
higher end of the spectrum (LSM’s 5 through 10). Therefore, if a main 
dimension of election debates is, or ought to be about the provision of services 
to the underprivileged, electronic media (television and radio) not only dominate 
the audience, but they also get at the right audience. In contrast, print media 
reaches a much smaller audience, and speaks to those who already have much of 
what they need. This is a key message for opposition parties who tend to 
concentrate their campaign advertising in newspapers.   
 
The consequences of these initial observations about media access and use 
become much more obvious if we compare South Africa to a place like the 
United States.  In the US, there is almost universal access to newspapers and to 
television and radio broadcast news, increasingly close-to-universal access to 
cable or satellite television, and rapidly expanding access to internet media. Yet 
there are dozens of national cable or satellite news providers who compete with 
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the four national broadcast networks, around 20 national radio networks, over 
1,000 local television stations, 6,000 cable television systems, over 1,600 daily 
newspapers, 7,500 weeklies, and 11,000 radio stations.
10
 Therefore, while 
universal access and blanket coverage dangles the tantalizing possibility of 
reaching very large audiences, hyper-market segmentation simultaneously 
makes this possibility extremely unlikely since, with the exception of a few 
major national events like the national football championship game (Super 
Bowl), only relatively small segments of the national audience are ever tuned 
into a particular station or read a particular paper.  Consequently, one immediate 
lesson we can draw is that it would be relatively easier for an interest group to 
run a media-based advocacy campaign in South Africa that could reach large 
proportions of the public by advertising in a relatively small number of stations 
or titles than in the United States.  
 
 
Voter interest in media election coverage 
 
To date, we have seen that physical access to and use of media for political news 
is fairly widespread, and that radio and television use, at least in urban South 
Africa, is high and probably not that much lower than in the United States.  But 
are these levels of media use maintained during election campaigns?  In South 
Africa’s case, the data reveal a clear answer of “no.” According to the 
Comparative National Election Project / South African National Election Study 
(CNEP / SANES) post election surveys of 2004 and 2009, only about one-half 
of all people told interviewers that they had been “very” or “somewhat 
interested” in those general elections. In striking contrast, 90 percent of all 
American respondents were similarly interested in the 1992 Presidential 
campaign between George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, and the 
20004 contest between George W. Bush and John Kerry (see Table 1). 
 
In fact, the data suggest that many South African news consumers systematically 
“tune out” election news. That is, while 85 percent regularly watch TV news, 
just 43 percent said they regularly followed the 2009 campaign on television and 
47 percent said they paid a “great deal” or “some” attention to the election news 
that they did read. The proportion of regular radio news consumers fell from 87 
percent in general to 27 percent for election news with just 35 percent paying 
attention to that news. And for newspapers, the corresponding proportions were 
54 percent, 19 percent and 30 percent.  Less than one in ten followed election 
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7 
news on radio (9 percent) or television (6 percent) talk shows and just 1 percent 
followed through internet news sites or chat rooms (Table 1).   
 
At the same time, most of these figures were significantly higher in 2009 than in 
2004, which we would argue was a consequence of the increased competition to 
the African National Congress (ANC) presented by the Congress of the People 
(COPE) in 2009. While radio use decreased, both television news viewership 
and newspaper readership increased substantially (by 12 and 6 percentage points 
respectively). More importantly, attention to election news also increased 
substantially for television viewers (30 percent to 47 percent) and newspaper 
readers (19 percent to 30 percent). Whether or not these levels of “virtual 
engagement” with the electoral process continue to rise will depend on whether 
increasing numbers of voters, especially African voters, believe the election 
result is not a foregone conclusion and thus feel they have a reason to keep in 
touch with the actual campaign. Given the foibles of COPE since the 2009 
election, we have little confidence that they will.  But even with the increased 
levels of media use in 2009, South Africans are still far less likely than 
Americans to follow their campaigns through the mass media through television 
(43 percent to 71 percent), newspapers (19 percent to 37 percent) and internet (1 
percent to 28 percent), though they maintain a slight edge in radio (37 percent to 
27 percent) (Table 1).   
 














Interest in Election Campaigns* 90 90 48 51 
     
Election News Use**     
Television 73 71 31 43 
Radio  -- 37 33 27 
Newspapers 74 37 13 19 
Radio Talk Shows -- --    9 
TV Talks Shows  -- --    6 
Internet -- 28   1   1 
     
Election News Attention***     
Television 71 -- 30 47 
Radio -- -- 33 35 
Newspaper 66 -- 19 30 
Internet -- --   1   1 
Source: Comparative National Elections Project 
*     Very / somewhat interested 
**   Follow campaign daily / 3-4 times a week 
*** Paid great deal / some attention 
 
8 
The quality of media election coverage 
 
One might speculate that South Africans’ low levels of attention to campaign 
news are a function of their distrust of media in general.  Yet since the requisite 
questions were first asked in 2000, Afrobarometer surveys have consistently 
found higher levels of popular trust in the SABC than for any other national 
institution, including the President and Parliament (Glenn and Mattes, 
forthcoming 2011). And while it is true that trust in the SABC (as well as in 
newspapers) eroded between the 2004 and 2009 campaigns (from 70 percent to 
63 percent for the SABC, putting the SABC behind E-TV; and from 57 percent 
to 45 percent for newspapers), levels of media trust are still far more widespread 
than levels of actual campaign news use. As for its election coverage, very few 
South Africans thought, either in 2004 or 2009, that the media they used were 
biased toward any specific political party. In 2009, the figures were just 6 
percent each for television, radio or newspapers, the vast majority of which 
detected bias towards the governing African National Congress rather than any 
opposition party (Table 2). 
 














Trust in News Media     
SABC -- -- 70 63 
E TV -- -- 67 67 
Newspapers -- -- 57 45 
     
Perceived Bias     
Television News 34 11   5   6 
Radio News -- 18   9   6 
Newspaper 45 32   6   6 
Television Talk Show -- 14   2   3 
Radio Talk show -- 18   4   2 
Source: Comparative National Elections Project 
 
Moreover, popular perceptions were quite accurate.  Media Tenor’s analyses of 
the 2004 and 2009 campaigns show that while the ANC received a greater 
volume of coverage than other parties, its overall share of coverage was far 
lower than its proportion of parliamentary representation would suggest, while 
most opposition parties received higher levels of coverage (which is, of course, 
only one criterion for judging bias). More importantly, there was no evidence 





   
 
For example, in 2004, while the ANC held over two-thirds of the seats in 
parliament, and controlled most provincial governments, it received only 39 
percent of the total coverage of all political parties (compared to 20 percent for 
the Democratic Alliance, Inkatha Freedom Party 11 percent, and the New 
National Party 9 percent, and the remainder of coverage spread over 21 other 
political parties). By far, the typical news media statement about any of the 
major parties was neutral and no party received substantially more or less 
positive or negative reporting. This held true across radio, television and 
newspaper coverage.  In 2009, the ANC did receive a substantially larger share 
of all coverage (52 percent) followed by COPE (18 percent), DA (12 percent) 
and IFP (6 percent). But, as in 2004, the average media statement about any 
party was still likely to be neutral, though the share of both positive and negative 
reporting rose for all parties. And coverage of the ANC and the IFP contained 
about 3 percentage points more negative than positive statements, roughly about 
the same balance as 2004. The number of positive statements about the two key 
opposition parties, the DA and COPE, however, outnumbered negative 
statements by a substantial margin (Table 3).   
 
Table 3: Perceptions of biased coverage of South African election 
campaigns 
 2004 2009 










 Neg Neutral Pos Neg Neutral Pos 
African National 
Congress 
39 16 72 12 52 29 45 26 
Congress of the 
People 
-- -- -- -- 18 17 50 33 
Democratic 
Alliance 
20 15 75 10 12 11 60 29 
Inkatha Freedom 
Party 
11 14 78   9  6 26 52 23 
New National Party   9 10 75 14 -- -- --- -- 
Source: Media Tenor 
 
The larger significance of the otherwise trivial levels of perceived media bias in 
South Africa is clear only once we compare them to the United States where 
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all media items were free of bias free, with just 16 percent of items considered biased. They 
observed that “when the media did exhibit clear bias it was largely due to covering allegations 
without allowing for the party or person about whom the allegation was made to respond.”  
 
10 
high levels of news media access and use are compromised by the fact that 
significant proportions of all potential voters believe that the media they use are 
biased toward one or the other of the two main political parties. In 2004, the 
Republicans and Democrats received an almost equal share of coverage (49 
percent versus 51 percent), but the Obama factor resulted in a decided 
Democratic edge in 2008 (56 percent) (Table 3).
12
 Yet in 2004, 32 percent said 
that the newspaper they used most often for campaign news was biased, 18 
percent for radio news, and 11 percent for television news). The U.S. data also 
offers at least one other important lesson.  Popular perceptions of media bias in 
2004 were substantially lower than those measured in the 1992 campaign. The 
reason for this is, ironically, the growing diversification and ideological nature 
of the American news media. Because more people can now find a news show 
which agrees with their own partisan preference, they are less likely to perceive 
a partisan bias than in 1992 when most viewers were restricted to watching one 
of the three main network news programs. 
 
Yet in neither country do the news media depict the election as a contest of 
public policy or ideology. According to the Media Tenor analyses of media 
coverage, just 25 percent of all South African campaign coverage in 2004 
focussed on the political parties’ stances on issues of public policy, while 75 
percent focussed on non-policy matters such as electioneering, internal party 
political issues, or leadership debates. In 2009, with the attendant controversy 
over Jacob Zuma’s challenge to Thabo Mbeki and his corruption charges, as 
well as the resulting split in the ANC and the formation of COPE, the share of 
policy coverage declined even further to just 9 percent of all coverage.  Policy 
coverage in the United States amounted to no more than 20 percent of all 




Yet even when the South African news media focus specifically on a political 
party, policy still makes up a minority of coverage. Of the parties that won 
parliamentary seats, the small African Christian Democratic Party received the 
highest proportion of policy coverage in both 2004 and 2009 (with 45 percent, 
and 28 percent respectively). Therefore, election coverage in South Africa is 
largely not about public policy, but about people and personality. This is yet 
another piece of evidence which suggests that South African election campaigns 
are not propitious sites for policy advocacy campaigns.   
 
To the extent that South African news media do focus on policy coverage, they 
tend get the balance of issues right, at least in terms of the issues that are salient 
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11 
to voters. We compare the results of the Media Tenor media content analysis 
with responses to a CNEP / SANES question that asked respondents which 
issues were, at the time of the election, the most important ones that government 
should address (though these data should be compared with some caution: news 
media can decide to cover any issue, but respondents were only able to mention 
up to three issues). In 2004, the issues mentioned most frequently by citizens 
were jobs (25 percent of all “mentions”), social issues (like poverty and service 
delivery) (14 percent), crime (13 percent), health (11 percent) and housing (9 
percent). With the exception of housing, these issues were all amongst the seven 
issues most frequently discussed by the news media.  At the same time, the data 
suggest that the news media tended to under-emphasize social policy, crime and 
education in comparison to voter concerns, and over-emphasize economic and 
business policy (see Table 4).  
 
Within the share of policy coverage, the relative balance of issues also matches 
up well with what South African political parties actually say (at least as 
reflected by their election manifestoes).  For evidence, we turn to Media Tenor’s 
content analysis of the political parties’ 2009 campaign manifestos. Again, a 
comparison of the weight given to various issue by both party manifesto’s and 
news media campaign coverage reveals a broad overlap. At the same time, the 
data suggest that the political parties gave more emphasis to health issues than 
the media campaign coverage would imply, but so less to business, social issues, 





Table 4: Comparing the media agenda and public agenda 
 2004 2009 
 Media Citizens Media Citizens 
Non Policy   75   91  
Policy   25     9  
 100  100  
     
Social Policy 12 14 21 17 
-Poverty / Destitution  (8)  (8) 
-Water  (6)  (6) 
-Food Shortage / Famine  (<1)  (2) 
-Orphans  (<1)  (1) 
-Other Services  (1)  (<1) 
Labour Policy 12 25   6 22 
Health 12 11   6   8 
Economic Policy / 
Management 
  8   2 15   6 
Security / Crime   7 13   8 12 
Justice / Prosecution   7   4 12   6 
-Corruption  (4)  (6) 
Foreign Affairs / Defence   6 <1   2 -- 
Culture   5 --   4 -- 
Minorities and Migration   5   1   1   1 
Housing   5   9   2   8 
Education   4   4 12   3 
Business Issues / Policy   4 -- 15 -- 
Gender / Family   2 <1   2 -- 
Budget   1   1   1   2 
Land / Agriculture   1   1   4   3 
Media / Media Policy   1 --   2 -- 
Energy    1 --   1 -- 
-Electricity     4    5 
Tourism   1 -- <1 -- 
Transport / Roads   1   3   1   5 
Environment <1 --   1 -- 
International Trade <1 --   2 -- 
Sport <1 -- <1 -- 
Technology/Research <1 -- <1 -- 
Mining <1 -- <1 -- 
Other Domestic Policies   5 <1   3   1 
-Communications  (<1)  (1) 
 100  100  
     









Social Policy 11 21 17 
Labour Policy / Employment   5   6 22 
Health 12   6   8 
Economic Policy / Management   5 15   6 
Security / Crime   8   8 12 
Justice / Prosecution   9 12   6 
Foreign Affairs / Defence   3   2 -- 
Culture   3   4 -- 
Minorities and Migration --   1   1 
Housing   5   2   8 
Education   8 12   3 
Business Issues / Policy   2 15 -- 
Gender / Family   1   2 -- 
Budget   2   1   2 
Land / Agriculture   5  4   3 
Energy  --   1   5 
Transport / Roads --   1   5 
Environment   5   1 -- 
Sport   1 <1 -- 
Infrastructure   6 --   1 
Government and Constitution   7 -- -- 
Source: Media Tenor and Comparative National Elections Project 
 
 
Direct face-to-face campaigning 
 
News media coverage is only one way that voters can hear and judge the 
arguments of contending parties, candidates and interest groups about the past 
performance of the governing party, or about all of the parties’ policy positions, 
campaign promises and overall suitability to govern.  Parties and candidates can 
also take their messages directly to the voters through mass rallies, personal 
contacts, or advertisements in the mass media.   
 
We focus first on the effectiveness with which South Africa’s parties take their 
messages directly to the voters through personal, face-to-face contacts. About 
one in four South Africans attended a campaign rally (23 percent) in 2004, 
increasing to almost a third (31 percent) in 2009 (Table 6).  While these levels of 
mass interaction with political parties are substantially higher than in the United 
States (11 percent in 1992 and 6 percent in 2004), the vast majority of this 
engagement takes place between the voters and the ANC. While 25 percent 
attended an ANC rally in 2009, no other party managed to attract more than 3 
percent to its events (Table 7).   
 
14 









Attended Rally 11   6 23 31 
     
Contacted by 
Party 
69 71 23 23 
In Person -- 10 20 20 
Mail -- 44   1 <1 
SMS -- -- --   3 
Telephone -- 46          2   1 
E-Mail -- 13 <1   1 
Source: Comparative National Elections Project 
 
Yet American political parties contact far larger proportions of voters, and do so 
through a wider variety of methods. In 2004, almost three quarters of Americans 
said they were contacted by a party (71 percent) compared to just one-fifth (21 
percent) of the South African electorate. And while US parties use a wide 
repertoire of methods (phone, mail, email and personal visits), South Africa 
parties employ household canvassing and personal visits almost solely. Again, 
voters were far more likely to be contacted by the ANC (19 percent) than any 
opposition party (COPE 7 percent, DA 6 percent), though almost all parties 
relied on personal visits compared to any other method.   
 
Table 7: Direct campaigning in South Africa, 2009 
 Total ANC COPE DA IFP ID UDM ACDP FF+ 
Attended Rally 
of: 
31 25 3 3 2 0 1 0 0 
          
Contacted by 
Party 
23 19 7 6 2 2 1 1 <1 
          
In Person 20 15 6 3 2 1 1 1 <1 
SMS   3   1 1 2 <1 <1 0 <1 <1 
Telephone   1   1 1 <1 0 <1 0 <1 0 
E Mail   1   1 0 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
Mail <1 <1 0 0 0 <1 0 0 0 
Source: Comparative National Elections Project 
 
 
Campaign mass advertising  
 
Television is one of the quickest ways that an opposition party, particularly a 
new one, can rech a large number of voters and use its visual power to build a 
 
15 
distinctive image in voters’ minds. Yet television advertising was not allowed in 
South Africa during the 1994, 1999 or 2004 elections (with the exception of 
very short “public election broadcasts” in 2004, allocated on the basis of 
existing legislative representation and the current number of candidates).
14
 This 
left parties with the options of paying for adversitisments on radio or in 
newspapers (with print being particularly expensive) and meant that many 
opposition parties did not have the financial means to run a sustained advertising 
campaign. But in late 2008, South Africa’s Independent Communications 
Authority issued new regulations that required television networks to provide 
parties with free airtime. Television (and radio) broadcasting license holders were 
required to to make available four two-minute time slots every day for election 
broadcasts during the designated campaign period. And in contrast to the formula 
for allocating multi-party funding, airtime would be allocated proportionally based 
on the current number of candidates fielded by a party (rather than by its number 
of currently elected legislative representatives). Perhaps as important, the new 
regulations also enabled political parties, for the first time, to purchase normal 
commercial time for partisan advertisements.   
 
Therefore, as long as they were able to field a full slate of candiates, opposition 
parties were offered, for the first time, the possibility of reaching a national 
audience and cutting into some of the ANC’s huge advantages in face-to-face 
campaigning that we have described above.  For a variety of reasons, however, this 
potential was not fully realized. According to the SABC, 40 of the 84 allocated 
free two minute spots ulitmately went unused.
15
 One reason appears to be that 
smaller parties were either unfamiliar with the process of finding adequately 
skilled people to produce these spots and, or were unable to afford them.  Another 
reason seems to be the “last-minute” nature of the process. The regulations were 
only promulgated in late 2008, and subsequently met heavy resistance from the 
financially strapped SABC which did not want to to give away so much free 
advertising time.  Ultimately, the air time was only allocated once the IEC verified 
each party’s slate of candidates (since that was part of the allocation formula) 
which meant that the actual slots were only made available in time for the final 
three weeks of the campaign.  And while several parties also purchased additional 
slots of normal commercial time, the total number of slots was insufficient to bring 
the party campaigns to a majority of voters.   
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16 
According to Ornico Group, an organization specializing in monitoring South 
African advertising, 368 advertisements were aired on television between mid 
February and Election Day. Overall, just 42 percent of CNEP / SANES 
respondents recalled seeing any of these advertisements. Yet this still outpaced 
the reach of party advertising on radio (where 31 percent recalled hearing an ad) 
or in newspapers (where 30 percent remembered seeing one).  As a result, the 
2009 experiment in television advertising expanded the “reach” of the campaign 
to a larger slice of the electorate compared to previous strategies that relied only 
on radio and print.  It also gave them greater access to “independent voters” -- 
that is respondents who said they did not feel close to any particular party, and 
were therefore not already wedded to one party or another (see Table 8).  
 
Table 8: Advertisement recall  
 Television Radio Newspapers 
Any Ad (All Voters) 41 31 30 
Any Ad (Partisan 
Identifiers) 
43 38 32 
Any Ad (Independents) 40 28 26 
    
Specific Party Ads    
African National Congress  38 29 27 
Democratic Alliance 23 12 16 
Congress of the People 19 10 13 
Independent Democrats  7   3   5 
Inkatha Freedom Party  5   6   7 
Freedom Front +  3 <1   1 
United Democratic 
Movement 
 2   1   1 
African Muslim Party  2   1   1 
United Christian 
Democratic Party 
 1 <1   1 
Minority Front  1 <1 <1 
Azanian People’s 
Organization 
 1   1   1 
Pan Africanist Congress  1   1   1 
African Christian 
Democratic Party 
 1 <1   1 
Afrikaner Unity Movement  1 <1 <1 
Federal Alliance --   1 -- 
Source: Comparative National Elections Project / South Africa National Elections Study 
 
At the same time, the “reach” of the respective parties varied widely. According 
to Ornico, the total value of television ads (whether free or purchased) broadcast 
by the ANC came to R8.1 million and were seen by 38 percent of citizens, and 
for the DA, R4.1 million, which where were seen by 23 percent. No other 
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party’s total airtime came close to either of these. Yet while smaller opposition 
parties were only able to make use of much smaller amounts of time, they 
received far more “bang for the buck” given their limited investments.  For 
instance, while COPE’s total airtime use was worth about one-eighth of the DA, 
it reached almost as many voters (19 percent). The same type of 
disproportionate effect is true for the ID and especially the IFP (see Table 9).   
 
While the data should be treated with some caution due to problems in recall and 
projection, the data in Table 9 also suggests that most parties achieved far more 
return on their adspend (at least in terms of sheer exposure) from television 
rather than radio (no data is available on print adspend).  Indeed, there are some 
examples of gross “overspend” on radio, such as the IFP which spent R2million 
on radio ads that were heard by 6 percent when a mere R32,500 investment in a 
television spot got almost the same exposure!  The FF+ and ACDP also spent 
relatively large fortunes to speak to similarly small audiences. 
 
Table 9: Citizen viewership of campaign advertising versus party 
adspend 
 Television Radio 













ANC 220 R8 126 916 38 3319 R9 736 050 29 
DA 83 R4  056 588 23 1111 R5 729 422 12 
COPE 27 R    537 500 19     14 R     54 884 10 
ID   6 R    278 667  7 -- --   3 
IFP   3 R      32 500  5 1493 R2 038 499   6 
FF+   5 R    212 500  3   666 R2 715 421 <1 
UDM -- --  2 -- --   1 
AMP*   2 R  279 000  2    28 R   123 038   1 
UCDP**   7 R  243 000  1 -- -- <1 
MF -- --  1 -- -- <1 
Azapo   3 R     86 250  1  97 R   189 612   1 
PAC   3 R     48 750  1  45 R   376 275   1 
ACDP   4 R   193 500  1 228 R1 200 773 <1 
AUM -- --  1 -- --- <1 
FA -- -- -- -- --0   1 
Source:  Comparative National Elections Project and Ornico 
*     Ad time attributed to Al Jama AH 






The voting decision 
 
A final factor that limits the potential of South African election campaigns as 
sites of policy debate and interest group advocacy is that that relatively few 
voters are available for persuasion. In both 2004 and 2009, just one in ten 
respondents told CNEP / SANES interviewers that they had made up their mind 
in the final few weeks of the campaign. In contrast, four-in-ten U.S. voters (46 
percent) said they decided during either the early or late campaign period in 
1992, declining to one-third (32 percent) in 2004 (Table 10). Yet in 2009, this 
was precisely when South Africa’s political parties spent most of their money on 
advertising, and when free television slots were finally made available. About 
85 percent of all people either had made up their minds before the election or 
said they did not vote. In a sense, one could say that the entire campaign was run 
for the benefit of less than one in five voters.   
 
Table 10:  Date of voter decision 








On election day NA 7 4 3 
In the last few weeks before 
election 
22 11 6 6 
At least a month before the 
election 
23 14 5 6 
Before the campaign started 32 42 57 64 
Did not vote 22 26 28 21 
 
 
Campaigns as sites for policy debate and 
policy advocacy 
 
We return to the question we set out at the beginning of this chapter. How useful 
are election campaigns as a site for South African interest groups to advocate 
policy change, either on their own or through allied political parties? The 
evidence presented here strongly suggest that election campaigns, at least as 
presently structured and executed, are not good forums for interest groups to 
advocate for policy change.   
 
First of all, we have seen that South African election campaigns enjoy fairly 
limited levels of public visibility. While South Africans enjoy fairly widespread 
levels of access to and use of news media in general, large proportions of voters, 
many of whom have either already decided who they will vote for, or already 
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concluded that no party represents their interests,
16
 systematically “tune out” and 
ignore the campaign. Indeed, less than 60 percent of all eligible voters went to 
the polls in 2009.  Second, the evidence suggests that at least part of the problem 
stems from the way the South African news media cover campaign.  While they 
are generally balanced in both time and interpretation, news media 
overwhelmingly focus on things other than the parties’ policy positions or 
pronouncements. Third, evidence also suggests that South Africa’s political 
parties are also part of the problem. Besides mobilizing their niche support 
groups through door-to-door canvassing, party campaign strategies are relatively 
unimaginative in using other methods to attract the attention of voters and 
ultimately reach relatively limited parts of the electorate. At the same time, 
parties also hamstrung by the sheer cost of running nationally based face-to-face 
campaigns, or of reaching the national electorate through television advertising.  
 
If election campaigns are to become more meaningful vehicles for national 
discussion of where South Africa has been, and where it is going, and which 
party is best placed to take it there, the country’s political parties need to 
become far better skilled at the production of television advertising, as well as 
other forms of directly contacting voters. The South African news media also 
need to do a better job covering the positions and campaign statements of 
political parties and candidates, not just the spectacle of campaign events, issues 
of personality, or horse-race assessments of who is ahead and who is behind.  In 
turn, the Independent Electoral Commission needs to revisit its method and 
formula of distributing funds. If elections are to be contests of ideas and 
policies, larger proportions of funding need to be made available to all political 
parties on an equal (rather than proportional) basis. And both the IEC and 
ICASA need to develop ways to provide greater technical support to all political 
parties so they can make better use of the television and take their campaigns to 
larger numbers of voters. Finally, South Africa’s political parties need to 
become far better at the use of available platforms and media through the five 
year election cycle (such as local ward councillors or party representatives, as 
well as free media coverage of parliamentary activity) rather than waiting for the 
final six week election campaign. Accordingly, more public funds need to be 
made available throughout the five year election cycle, rather than only in the 
final campaign period.   
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  For evidence to this effect, see Robert Mattes, The Election Book: Judgment and Choice in 
South Africa’s 1994 Election (Cape Town: Idasa, 1995), and Karen Feree, Framing the Race 
in South Africa: The Political Origins of Racial-Census Election (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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